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We review studies on monetary transmission in the EU countries using the VAR approach 
and analyse why they often lead to divergent outcomes. Firstly, we estimate 43 VAR models 
across ten EU countries and compare the robustness of the ranking of the magnitudes of the 
price and output responses. The main specification differences between the VAR models are 
the use of two different sample periods; the inclusion of additional variables; and the use of 
recursive, long run, and structural identification schemes. Secondly, we calculate rank 
correlations between the output and price responses of a recursive VAR and a structural VAR 
to the financial structure indicators used by Cecchetti (1999), who argued that legal systems 
cause financial structure, which in turn causes asymmetric transmission. In contrast to 
Cecchetti, we find that there is little correlation.  
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 1. Introduction 
For the first time since the Roman Empire, a large portion of Europe now shares a 
common currency. Since the start of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 
Europe at the beginning of 1999, the European Central Bank (ECB) has been 
responsible for monetary policy in Europe; however, the impact of these policy 
decisions may differ across euro zone countries. The existing empirical evidence does 
not give a clear picture of how important these differences actually are, or if they even 
exist. 
At least four modelling strategies have been attempted (OECD, 1999) in this 
line of literature: 
•  simulating existing macroeconomic (single or multi-country) models; 
•  using small structural models; 
•  employing reduced form equations; 
•  testing policies with structural Vector Autoregression (VAR) models. 
Differences in modelling strategies are likely to lead to differences in outcomes. 
However, even within the same 'class' of models conclusions often differ 
substantially. 
The first purpose of this paper is to review studies using the VAR approach 
and to analyse why they often lead to divergent outcomes. The reason for selecting the 
VAR class of models is that there is no requirement to split between exogenous and 
endogenous variables. It is also a relatively free format that can be modelled similarly 
for each country. Modern econometric methods can also be used to cope with long run 
restrictions if that is required. We look at various models encompassing these 
differences. 
One commonly cited study is Cecchetti (1999), who concludes upon the 
evidence of a VAR model that there are differences in monetary transmission across 
European Union countries and that these differences are caused by differing financial 
structures. In his view, the different financial structures are caused by the legal 
traditions of the countries, English common law, French civil law, Scandinavian law, 
and German law. Given the perceived differences in estimates across studies, this may 
not be a robust conclusion. The second purpose of this paper is therefore to examine 
to what extent Cecchetti’s results are driven by the selection of one particular VAR 
model.  The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises 
VAR studies focusing on differences in monetary transmission across EU countries. 
Only studies with estimates for at least three European countries are included in our 
review. This is a little ad hoc but allows for concentration on more comparable 
studies. Section 3 presents the outcomes of 43 VAR models. Section 4 re-examines 
the conclusions of Cecchetti in light of our study of the robustness of VAR estimates. 
The final section offers some concluding comments.  
 
 
2. VAR Studies: An overview 
 
Modelling choices 
The original VAR models as proposed by Sims (1980) were an alternative to large 
scale macro-econometric models and do not rely on “incredible” identifying 
assumptions. VAR models have subsequently been widely used for monetary analysis 
as table 1 shows.
1 A brief look at table 1 should be enough to make the reader 
question the robustness of VAR conclusions. In this section we will discuss the VAR 
modelling process before going on to discuss the conclusions and modelling 
differences of the studies summarized in table 1. 
In VAR modelling there are many choices that need to be made regarding the 
specification of the model, all of which have the potential to alter the estimated 
responses and hence, alter any conclusion regarding asymmetric transmission across 
countries.
2 We now proceed with a basic step-by-step guide to the VAR modelling 
procedure. 
Before estimating a model for cross country analysis the countries taken up in 
the sample have to be chosen. On this point the more the better - the number of 
countries will not change the results for each individual country but it may change the 
overall conclusion regarding the significance of any asymmetries in transmission. 
After choosing the countries of interest one first estimates the reduced form as a 
vector autoregression as in equation 1.
3 
                                                 
1 Table 1 only shows some studies that look at multiple countries. The use of VAR models for single 
country analysis is even more widespread. 
2 For example, Cochrane (1998) finds that output responses can vary a lot as one changes identifying 
assumptions. 
3 For simplicity of exposition we only show endogenous variables in the equations. 
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where yt is the vector of endogenous variables, A(L) is a lag polynomial of order p, 
and ut is a vector of reduced form errors. At this stage 3 choices need to be made. 
Firstly, which variables are going to be included? Secondly, what is the sample period 
going to be? And finally, how many lags should be included?
4 We will analyse the 
issue of how many variables should be included below when we discuss the 
identification of the model; here it will suffice to note that the larger and more 
complicated a VAR model becomes, the more parameters in the A(L) matrices need to 
be estimated and the more degrees of freedom are used.  
There is also a trade-off over the sample period: the longer a sample period is, 
the more degrees of freedom available for estimation, but the greater the problem with 
parameter constancy. In an ideal world, there would be a long sample period that is a 
single regime. But the actual world isn’t ideal: governments change and even when 
they don’t their policy regimes do.
5 More degrees of freedom can be gained by 
choosing to employ monthly instead of quarterly data. But, many series are not 
available at a monthly frequency, chief among these being GDP; industrial production 
is then usually employed as a proxy.
6 
The choice of an appropriate lag length is also important because a time series 
study has only a limited number of degrees of freedom with which to work. The lag 
length has to be sufficiently great to make the residuals white noise, which may not be 
compatible with the limited degrees of freedom available. Small differences in the 
response for each individual country may add up to much greater uncertainty when 
looking for differences in transmission between countries. 
After estimating the reduced form VAR we would like to be able to discuss 
the impact of changes in one variable on another. We cannot, however, simply change 
one of the elements of ut and see what happens because the errors in ut are correlated 
                                                 
4 That is the dimension of the vector y, the number of sample points, T, and the order of A(L), p. 
5 For example, the exchange rate regime of the UK has changed frequently over the past 30 years. 
6 However, some techniques in VAR modelling rely on long run economic theory where the actual time 
in years is of more importance than the number of observations available. For example, Lothian and 
Taylor (1996) show that a unit root can only be rejected for the dollar-sterling real exchange rate if a 
sample period of around 100 years is used, regardless of the sampling frequency of the exchange rate 
series. 
  3with each other. We need to identify the underlying orthogonal shocks, et, as shown in 
equation 2 in moving average form. 
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where B(L) is an infinite order lag polynomial. The relationship between the reduced 
form model and the structural model are shown in the next four equations. 
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Equation 3 shows that the structural shocks are derived from their reduced form 
counterparts through the B0 matrix: the contemporaneous correlation matrix from the 
structural moving average representation. This does not imply that only 
contemporaneous restrictions can be imposed because long run restrictions can be 
imposed through (non-linear) restrictions on the B0 matrix. Equation 4 splits the 
infinite order lag polynomial from the structural form into the contemporaneous 
correlations,  B0, and the lagged correlations. Equation 5 maps each reduced form 
coefficient matrix onto its structural form counterpart. This can be done simply if the 
researcher knows the B0 matrix of contemporaneous correlations. B0  is identified 
through the unrestricted covariance matrix of the reduced form, Σ, and the diagonal 
covariance matrix of the structural form, Λ, as in equation 6. This, unfortunately, does 
not uniquely identify B0 - there are many matrices that satisfy equation 6. To go from 
the reduced form initially estimated as a VAR(p) to the structural form wherein the 
impulse responses have a meaningful interpretation, one has to impose n
2 identifying 
restrictions. n(n+1)/2 restrictions are imposed by making the covariance matrix of the 
residuals, Λ, an identity matrix. This leaves n(n-1)/2 to be imposed elsewhere in the 
system. In a VAR with only four variables, six extra restrictions (over and above 
those imposed by the identity matrix for the residuals) are needed; it is easy to see that 
a larger VAR runs the risk of falling foul of Sims (1980) incredible restrictions 
criticism. One of the most commonly used identification strategies is the Cholesky 
  4decomposition shown for a four variable system of prices, P, output, Y, interest rates, 
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43 42 41
32 31
21          ( 7 )  
 
The six restrictions here are represented by the zero elements above the diagonal. This 
is in itself a theoretical restriction of the error structure because each variable 
responds contemporaneously to some variables but not to others and is ordered in the 
system. Taking the third row we can discuss what this means for the interest rate. Due 
to the distribution of the zero elements we can see that the interest rate responds 
contemporaneously to the underlying price and output shocks, but not to the exchange 
rate shocks. The flip side of this strategy, shown by the third column, is that prices 
and output do not respond contemporaneously to interest rate shocks whilst the 
exchange rate does. This means that the variables follow a causal ordering: prices, 
output, the interest rate, and the exchange rate. For the system as a whole this causal 
ordering is a very strong restriction. 
The system does not need to be identified as a whole; it can be partially 
identified. Partial identification relies solely on identifying a reaction function for 
monetary policy; the remaining shocks are left unidentified.
7 As shown by Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Evans (1999), the ordering of variables in the interest rate equation 
is the only important identification criterion if one is only concerned with monetary 
policy. Within the variables that are ordered before the interest rate equation the order 
makes no difference to estimated responses to a monetary policy shock. For example, 
in the system shown in equation 7 it makes no difference if prices or output 
innovations are at the top of the et vector, only whether they are above or below the 
interest rate. This allows the researcher to only consider the ordering of the interest 
rate variable, thus reducing considerably the number of identifying restrictions 
required. That those variables contemporaneously affected by interest rate shocks do 
not enter the interest rate feedback rule and those that don’t react contemporaneously 
                                                 
7 The other structural shocks have no economic meaning and the analysis of responses to the shocks is 
meaningless. 
  5do enter the rule is still quite restrictive. McCallum (1999) argues that a policy rule 
should not include the current price level or output because these are not observable; 
the data are only published with a lag. This cannot be combined with the belief that 
monetary policy only has a lagged effect with a Cholesky decomposition. 
Another potential source of identifying restrictions is the use of long run 
restrictions as pioneered by Blanchard and Quah (1989). A long run restriction usually 
takes the form that a shock to one variable has no long run impact on another. For 
example, if monetary neutrality holds, monetary shocks should have no long run 
effect on output. Long run restrictions are equivalent to setting a zero restrictions on 
the B1 matrix, which in turn is equivalent to a non-linear constraint on the B0 matrix. 
Although Blanchard and Quah only had a two variable VAR of output and 
unemployment their technique has been extended and used in the analysis of 
monetary policy. 
So far we have said nothing about the properties of the individual time series. 
A common finding for macroeconomic variables is that they are integrated.
8 
Regressing one integrated variable on another can lead to spurious regressions, a 
commonly used example being the finding that rainfall causes inflation. The unit roots 
cannot be ignored: either the series can be differenced to remove the unit roots, or, if 
present in the system, cointegration can be utilised. If a linear combination of two (or 
more) series that are integrated of order one
9 is not integrated, the series are said to be 
cointegrated. Cointegration can be tested for with the Johansen technique. If there is 
evidence of cointegration it is a useful source of the extra restrictions required to 
move to the structural form. The cointegrating vector needs to be chosen from the data 
or it can be selected for a priori reasons.
10  If the cointegrating relationship is selected 
for a priori reasons it must be tested to see if this is an appropriate restriction. The 
number of restrictions that can be gleaned through cointegrating relationships is less 
than the n(n-1)/2 required for identification, so other restrictions are still needed. 
Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) show, however, that if enough of the variables are 
cointegrated then an analysis in levels is still correct because the ordinary least 
squares estimator (OLS) of the reduced form (equation 1) efficiently estimates the 
cointegrating relationship anyway. 
                                                 
8 That is, one or more of the roots of the lag polynomial lie outside the unit circle. 
9 Series that are integrated of order 1 need to be differenced once to be made stationary. 
10 An a priori reason could come from something like a money demand equation. 
  6Effectively there are 3 modelling choices at this stage: 1) difference any 
integrated time series until they are stationary, 2) estimate the model in error 
correction format, thereby specifically taking account of any cointegration, or 3) 
estimate by OLS and rely on the Sims, Stock and Watson result. 
Even if the same VAR model has been estimated, there can still be 
discrepancies arising from the particular impulse responses that are employed. The 
two different impulses that are widely used are the one unit shock and the one 
standard deviation shock. The shapes of any impulse responses created by these two 
different shocks are the same because one is just a linear transformation of the other. 
The magnitudes of the responses will differ, however. Where the standard deviations 
of shocks are different across countries this modelling choice will affect the 
appearance of asymmetric transmission. It makes more sense to compare all the 
countries using a standard 100 basis points impulse as it will be a common policy 
change across all countries. However, in the sample period under consideration a 100 
basis points shock was not observed in the countries in our sample, which may make 
this shock fall foul of the Lucas critique. 
 
Digression on the price puzzle 
A common finding of VAR research into the monetary transmission mechanism is 
that a rise in interest rates leads to an increase in the price level. This counter intuitive 
phenomenon has been dubbed the ‘price puzzle’. Its seriousness is a matter of debate: 
either the price responses alone are meaningless but the other responses are reliable, 
or there is something wrong that casts serious doubt about all of the estimates from 
the model if prices do not respond as theory suggests. For example, Ramaswamy and 
Sloek (1997), by focusing solely on the output responses to monetary shocks, 
inherently assume that the price puzzle does not invalidate conclusions about the real 
effects of monetary policy.
11 Giordani (2004) shows that a VAR model with a price 
puzzle overestimates the output responses; he is one of many authors who argue that 
the presence of the price puzzle renders the other responses meaningless. 
The occurrence of the price puzzle is usually attributed to a failure to identify 
actual shocks to interest rates. If inflation is expected to rise in the future a central 
bank will raise interest rates to try to arrest the increase in inflation. A model that 
                                                 
11 Our replications of the Ramaswamy and Sloek model have generated price puzzles. 
  7doesn’t capture this expected increase in inflation will exhibit the price puzzle 
because the endogenous response of the central bank to higher expected inflation will 
be treated as a shock when it is no such thing. Using equation 7 to illustrate this point, 
the endogenous response of interest rates to expected inflation is not captured by b31 
or b32 (or by the lag structure), instead it forms part of ei. The model is misspecified 
because it does not take account of the forward looking nature of monetary policy.
12 
Sims pioneered the use of commodity prices acting as an information variable – the 
oil price, for example, has a forward looking component and can be used to predict 
inflation. The inclusion of the oil price for the US is generally successful in removing 
the endogenous part of monetary policy from the identified shocks of a VAR model. 
Other authors have suggested other causes. Giordani (2004) attributes the price 
puzzle to the exclusion of a measure of the output gap. Theoretical models of the 
transmission mechanism relate inflation to the position of an economy in the business 
cycle: in a recession there is little upward pressure on prices because firms have 
plenty of spare capacity so an interest rate reduction will be less inflationary in a 
recession than in a boom. Giordani uses data generated from a New Keynesian model 
of the economy to show that a VAR without a proxy for the output gap will generate a 
price puzzle even when the data comes from a model with the normal price response. 
He also shows that the identified VAR model will give larger (and therefore incorrect) 
estimates of the other responses. One should not believe the responses from a VAR 
model that displays the price puzzle according to this critique. Giordani also claims 
that the solution employing commodity prices is due to the fact that commodity prices 
vary cyclically with the US business cycle. Hence, including commodity prices works 
for US models because they approximate the output gap, not because they have a 
predictive ability for inflation per se. 
Hanson (2004) also dismisses the forecasting inflation story by showing that 
those variables that are the best at predicting inflation are not the most successful at 
removing the price puzzle. He claims that the price puzzle is due to estimating VAR 
models over multiple regimes so that two (or more) interest rate setting feedback rules 
have to be approximated by one equation. The shocks from the estimated equation do 
not tally with the actual shocks for either regime. He suggests that carefully selecting 
the sample period can remove the price puzzle. 
                                                 
12 However, the correct signs for the responses are insufficient to claim that the model is correctly 
  8The monetary policy of small open economies is widely seen as being highly 
dependent on external factors. Hence many authors (see Kim and Roubini 2000, for 
example) have suggested that without the nominal exchange rate the feedback rule for 
a small open economy will be misspecified, and likely to result in the price puzzle. 
Other authors have argued that European countries have followed German monetary 
policy so that monetary shocks are easier to identify if one also includes the German 
interest rate in the model (see Ehrmann 2000, for example). 
 
VAR findings 
Table 1 shows a summary of 11 VAR studies.
13 All of the papers consider the three 
largest EU countries: France, Germany, and the UK. Individual country studies are, 
by their nature, not focused on the question of asymmetric transmission of policy in 
Europe, hence we limit ourselves to those that are. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
The first point to make is that the various studies come to differing 
conclusions despite the common VAR methodology. Out of the 11 papers considered, 
only the studies of Gerlach and Smets (1995), Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998), Mojon 
and Peersman (2002)  conclude that there is little or no difference in the transmission 
of monetary shocks across countries. Unfortunately, the other studies disagree about 
the nature of the differences between countries. For instance, Ramaswamy and Sloek 
(1997) find that there are two groupings of countries: in Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK, the effects of monetary policy take longer to 
be felt and have greater magnitude. Philipsen and Wuyts (1999) also conclude that 
there are two different groups; however, the two studies do not have the same 
countries in each of the groups. 
Barran, Coudert and Mojon (1996) conclude that the lags of the responses are 
fairly similar but the magnitudes are not. Their ordering of the responses is correlated 
to a degree with the groupings of Ramaswamy and Sloek, although their conclusion 
about the timing is not. Dedola and Lippi (2004) conclude that Germany is affected 
                                                                                                                                            
specified. 
13 Whilst attempting to detail the differences between VAR models that have been used and their 
differing conclusions, table 1 is not intended to be an exhaustive list of all multi country VAR studies. 
  9more by a monetary shock than France or the UK; Italy is somewhere in between. 
Ehrmann (2000), in direct contrast to Dedola and Lippi, finds that the UK is much 
more sensitive to an interest rate shock than the other countries. Ehrmann also finds 
great variation across the other countries. Altavilla (2000) also concludes that there 
are differences between the countries. Again, there are two groupings and once again 
they don’t match the groupings of the other studies. 
Clements, Kontolemis and Levy (2001) also find differences and like 
Ramaswamy and Sloek they find that Austria, Germany and the Netherlands have a 
relatively greater response to monetary shocks. However, they do not conclude that 
there are 2 distinct groups. Furthermore, they report that Finland has one of the 
smallest responses, while Ramaswamy and Sloek found it to have one of the largest. 
Kim and Roubini (2000) conclude that there are differences in monetary transmission 
among the countries considered: Germany has the largest response; France, Italy and 
the UK have a smaller response. 
Whilst all studies summarised in table 1 find that the policy response in 
Germany is relatively large, the conclusions for the other countries diverge 
considerably. In light of the modelling discussion above we shall now look at some of 
the differences between the studies. 
Kieler and Saarenheimo, Gerlach and Smets, and Kim and Roubini only 
include the 4 largest European countries (Kieler and Saarenheimo just the largest 3); 
the first two of these constitute two-thirds of the studies concluding that there is little 
or no difference. At the other extreme are Ehrmann and Philipsen and Wuyts who 
include 13 countries and conclude that there are differences. 
The dimension of the VAR systems also varies widely. Four of the studies 
considered here use only three variables. At the other extreme are Kim and Roubini, 
who use 7. Four studies also use a different number of variables for each country, 
evidently in an attempt to better describe the reaction function of each central bank. 
There are also a wide range of sample periods studied. Philipsen and Wuyts 
choose the longest period at 27 years from 1972 to 1998. Ehrmann and Gerlach and 
Smets, go for a relatively short sample of 15 years. Ehrmann’s choice is clearly an 
attempt to avoid estimating across different regimes by choosing to start the sample 
period only after the frequent exchange rate parity alterations that occurred within the 
European Monetary System prior to 1983. Philipsen and Wuyts choose to go for more 
sample points. 
  10Most of the studies considered here do not discuss the lag  length issue. 
Philipsen and Wuyts and Ramaswamy and Sloek report that they use the Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC) to choose lag length; many of the other studies are silent 
on this issue.  As mentioned above, more lags may need more sample points, which 
can be obtained by using monthly data. However, eight of the eleven studies use data 
at a quarterly frequency including the one with the smallest time span, Gerlach and 
Smets. The study with the longest time span, Philipsen and Wuyts, uses monthly data. 
They state that this is not only to increase the number of observations, but also to 
make their contemporaneous restrictions more appropriate.
14  
There is also a split among the studies when it comes to the treatment of unit 
roots. Ramaswamy and Sloek, Kieler and Saarenheimo, and Kim and Roubini are 
among those that use their variables in levels even though they conclude that the 
variables are integrated. At the other extreme, Ehrmann and Altavilla estimate the 
models using the cointegration that is present. None of the studies difference the time 
series to achieve stationarity.  
The most commonly used identification strategy is the Cholesky 
decomposition. Studies employing this approach include Ramaswamy and Sloek, 
Philipsen and Wuyts, and Barran, Coudert, and Mojon. Gerlach and Smets use long 
run restrictions assuming that a monetary shock has no long run effect on GDP and 
also a similar restriction for a demand shock. These two shocks are distinguished by 
assuming that the monetary shock has no contemporaneous effect on GDP. Kim and 
Roubini use a set of (non recursive) contemporaneous restrictions based upon a model 
of maximising agents suggested by Sims and Zha (1995). 
Although Ehrmann uses the short term German interest rate in some of the 
models for countries other than Germany, he does not treat it as an exogenous 
variable. Whilst the Bundesbank set monetary policy with regard only to the German 
macroeconomic situation (and hence one would expect, for example, Italian price 
developments to have no effect on the Bundesbank’s policy), the authors here make 
little use of exogenous variables. Also Mojon and Peersman include the German 
interest rate endogenously into their models for the other countries. Kim and Roubini 
include oil prices and US interest rates endogenously in their models for European 
                                                 
14 Clearly, a no contemporaneous reaction restriction is more likely to be valid within one month than 
within one quarter. 
  11countries, when one would have thought these could also have been used 
exogenously. 
Philipsen and Wuyts and Kim and Roubini use a one standard deviation shock; 
the conclusions of these studies may not be the same when a common 100 basis points 
shock is used. Ramswamy and Sloek are among the other studies that use a 
standardised 100 basis points shock. 
 
 
3. VAR models 
 
The 43 VAR models that we estimated here follow these and other modelling 
suggestions so that the VARs chosen here are either used or suggested in the literature 
for the study of the transmission mechanism. They therefore seem to be good 
candidates to test the robustness of VAR conclusions regarding the asymmetrical 
transmission of monetary policy across Europe. A detailed description of the models 
is given in table 2. Data sources are shown in table 3. 
 
Tables 2 and 3 here 
 
The basic model is a three variable VAR estimated either quarterly with real 
GDP, prices and a short term interest rate, or monthly with industrial production 
instead of real GDP. The basic model is identified using the Cholesky decomposition. 
As such, the quarterly model is very similar to the specification of Ramaswamy and 
Sloek; the monthly model is akin to the Philipsen and Wuyts model. Two different 
sample periods were used: 1973-98 and 1980-98. The latter sample period was chosen 
to avoid the volatility of the 1970s. This model was also estimated in first differences 
and in terms of the yearly inflation rate and the HP filtered output gap. We then added 
more variables to the system. We added the German short term interest rate,
15 then the 
oil price as exogenous variables. Following this, we estimated the basic model with a 
fourth endogenous variable added: either money or the nominal effective exchange 
rate. We also estimated the models with different identification schemes. We have 
also included a model with long run restrictions in the style of Blanchard and Quah, 
                                                 
15 In the case of Germany we used the US Fed Funds rate. 
  12one estimated as a VECM with cointegration imposed according to the Johansen 
procedure, and one estimated using the identification scheme of Kim and Roubini, 
although the US variables by Kim and Roubini have been replaced by their German 
counterparts for the non-German countries.  
After calculating the impulse responses to a 100 basis points shock in each 
model we calculate four summary statistics for the responses of both output and 
prices: the peak negative effect, the timing of the peak and the sum of the effects over 
the first three and five years. We use these statistics to look at the robustness of the 
results, especially the cross country aspects, to the changes in model specification. 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
Figure 1 shows the results of Pearson’s correlation statistic between the 
methods for the peak effect on prices across countries. We chose the Pearson statistic 
over rank correlation statistics because the models all purport to be showing the same 
thing, hence the magnitudes should be similar across models and not just the rankings. 
Furthermore, the Pearson statistic allows the rankings to change among countries with 
very similar estimates without causing a dramatic fall in the correlation statistic. In 
figure 1, a significant positive correlation at the 1% level is coloured black, at the 5% 
level grey; a negative correlation is represented by a minus sign. Insignificant positive 
correlations are left blank. With this representation of the results it is easy to judge the 
overall robustness of the results by the colour of the figure: a very robust result would 
be very dark and have no minus signs. The estimates of the peak price response are 
clearly not robust. The first column of table 4 also shows this clearly; the mean 
correlation of the peak price responses is only 0.17. 
 
Table 4 here 
 
Figure 2 shows that the results are even less robust for the timing of the peak; 
there are very few significantly positive correlations and many negative correlations. 
The mean correlation from table 4 is only 0.16. 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
  13Figure 3 shows slightly more robustness among the quarterly recursive and the 
monthly recursive VARs for the sum over 60 months of the inflation responses. The 
rectangle of white and negative entries in figure 3 shows that there is no correlation 
between monthly and quarterly models, however. The mean correlation across all 
models of the 60 month sum of price responses is just 0.05. It may be tempting to treat 
all positive estimates for the sum as zero, in effect applying the prior belief that a 
positive interest rate shock does not cause prices to raise. If this is done the mean 
correlation rises to 0.08 as shown in the fourth column of table 4. We can do the 
correlation analysis again and exclude all non-negative results: this gives us column 5. 
The mean correlation of 0.17 is still very low, especially when one realises how few 
negative estimates there are for each model; only a very high correlation would be 
statistically significant with such few observations.
16 We also looked to see if 
summing over a shorter horizon improved matters. As can be seen from the last 
column of table 4, it did not. 
Figure 4 shows that there is greater robustness for the peak output effect, 
especially among the quarterly models, than was the case for price responses. As with 
prices there is no correlation among the timing of the peak effects and this is shown in 
figure 5. Figure 6 shows that the summed output loss is robust across the recursive 
models; the bands of insignificant correlations among the non-recursive models are 
striking. 
 
Figure 4 here 
 
Table 5 is the counterpart of table 4 for the correlation between the output 
results. One can see that the output responses are more robust than the price responses 
with mean correlations of 0.59 and 0.32 for the peak effect and the 60 month sum, 
respectively. Treating the positive sums as zero improves the mean correlation to 
0.49; leaving them out of the analysis altogether improves thing still further to 0.66. 
Choosing to look at the sum over 36 months makes little difference. 
 
Table 5 here 
 
                                                 
16 With 3 observations the one-sided 5% critical value for the Pearson statistic is 0.805. 
  14If we look at the two rows for the quarterly models with industrial production 
in figures 4 and 6, we can see that there is little correlation between these and the 
quarterly models with GDP. We can therefore conclude that choosing industrial 
production as a proxy for GDP is not a sound strategy for investigating asymmetric 
transmission. 
Two further hypotheses can be investigated with our results: Firstly, are the 
results robust for the models using the common Cholesky recursive identification? 
Secondly, are they robust across models that successfully remove the price puzzle? 
These issues are shown in tables 6 and 7. The price puzzle was so prevalent that, in 
order to include a meaningful number of models for table 7, we had to choose the 
relatively low hurdle of 5 or more negative sums for both price and output responses 




Table 6 here 
 
Restricting ourselves to the recursive VARs does not improve the robustness 
of the peak price response with the mean correlation falling from 0.17 to 0.16. The 
mean 60 month sum correlation rises from 0.05 to 0.17 but remains very low. The 
output results are more robust across the subset of recursive VARs, though. The mean 
correlations for the peak and the 60 month sum rise from 0.59 and 0.32 to 0.81 and 
0.81.  
The mean correlations for the non-price-puzzle models show an increase in the 
robustness of the peak price response but not of the sum of price responses. The mean 
correlation for the output measures is lower between the non-price-puzzle models than 
across all of the models. We can conclude that choosing the non-price-puzzle subset 
does not improve the robustness of the results. 
 
Table 7 here 
 
 
                                                 
17 The VARs that had five or less price puzzles as defined by a negative sum of price effects over 60 
months for the ten countries are as follows: Q80, Q731D, Q80GEIR, Q80IRD, Q80IRDV, M73ΠG, 
M80IRD, M73IRDV, M80IRDV, and KRM80. 
  154. Financial Structure 
 
In various recent studies it has been claimed that asymmetries in monetary policy 
transmission in the euro area may result from differences in financial structure. An 
often cited study is Cecchetti (1999), who bases his view on the lending view of 
monetary policy transmission, according to which monetary policy actions change the 
reserves available to the banking system, thereby affecting the willingness of banks to 
lend, and ultimately, the supply of loans.  
The theoretical foundation of the lending view focuses on the intermediation 
role of banks and capital market imperfections (see e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). 
The lending view has two parts, one that focuses on the balance sheet of borrowers 
and a second that focuses on bank loans.  
Monetary policy actions may affect firms’ net worth. By decreasing expected 
future sales, a deflationary monetary policy may decrease the firm’s net worth. Or the 
monetary hike may reduce the price of equity. A third way in which restrictive 
monetary policy may affect the balance sheet of firms is through the general price 
level: an unanticipated decline in the price level increases the value of firms’ 
liabilities in real terms. No matter what causes the decline in net worth, it will have 
important consequences. The lower the firm’s net worth the more severe the adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems are in lending to this firm. This, in turn, will 
restrict external financing.  
As far as the bank loans channel is concerned, it has been pointed out that 
some firms (notably small ones) are dependent on banks for finance. A reduction in 
the quantity of reserves forces a reduction in the level of deposits, which should be 
matched by a fall in loans. When loans and bonds are imperfect substitutes on the 
balance sheets of banks, a rise of the interest rate resulting in a liquidity squeeze may 
reduce the amount of bank loans. 
The weaker a country’s banking system, the stronger the expected impact of 
policy movements (Cecchetti, 1999). Monetary policy actions affect the reserves of 
the banks, thereby affecting their willingness to lend. How this will affect individual 
firms depends on the alternative financing methods available to them. Firms that can 
borrow in the bond market or issue equity will be less affected by contractions in bank 
loans than firms that rely entirely on bank financing. 
  16Cecchetti (1999) relates the estimates of the impact of monetary policy on 
output and inflation of Ehrmann (1998)
18 to an overall indicator for financial structure 
reflecting the presence of small banks, the health of the banking system, and firms’ 
possibilities for direct capital market access. Cecchetti concludes that there is a clear 
relationship between the estimated strength of monetary policy and the overall 
indicator for financial structure. Countries with many small banks, less healthy 
banking systems, and poorer direct capital market access display a greater sensitivity 
to monetary policy changes than do countries with big, healthy banks and deep, well-
developed capital markets. Cecchetti’s financial structure statistics cover banking 
industry and bank health statistics along with statistics for alternative sources of 
finance. 
Cecchetti combines the financial structure indicators into three summary 
statistics: one for the importance of small banks, one for bank health, and one for the 
availability of alternative finance. His summary statistic for each factor is a number 
between 1 and 3 based on a subjective weighting of the underlying statistics. This is 
then further combined into a predicted policy effectiveness indicator by averaging the 
scores for small banks, bank health, and alternative finance. The resulting indciators 
for the various countries are then further averaged into four legal families and 
compared to the VAR responses. 
We chose two of the VAR models that we estimated and compare their 
outcomes with the financial structure indicators reported in Cecchetti (1999). Instead 
of using a summary statistic, we examine whether there are significant relationships in 
the underlying data. Absence of such a relationship suggests that Cecchetti’s 
conclusion may be dependent upon the aggregation of the statistics. To this end we 
use Kendall’s rank tests between the summary statistics for the Q80 and KRM80 
models. We chose these models because the first is a representative recursive model 
that doesn’t suffer too much from the price puzzle and the second is the most 
successful at resolving the price puzzle across all countries. 
 
Table 8 here 
                                                 
18 This is the working paper version of Ehrmann (2000). 
  17Table 8 shows the Kendall’s rank correlations between the summary statistics 
from the Q80 model and Cecchetti’s financial structure indicators.
19 Since price and 
output responses to a positive interest rate shock should be negative, a positive 
correlation means that a large value of a Cecchetti indicator is associated with a small 
response. The only significant results for the banking industry indicators are a 
negative correlation with the timing of the peak price response and a positive 
correlation with the sum over 36 months (but not over 60 months). There are no 
statistically significant results for the output responses. However, if we look at the 
correlation between Cecchetti’s overall statistic for the importance of small banks and 
the output response statistics we get a very different picture: more small banks is 
correlated significantly with a smaller output response at the 5% level. Theory 
predicts the opposite: smaller banks are more likely to contract their loan supply 
following an interest rate hike. 
There is only one significant correlation for bank health when using the 
underlying statistics; a higher average Thompson rating is associated with a larger fall 
of prices over 36 months (but again, not over 60 months). Again, theory would 
suggest the opposite: healthier banks should be better able to shield their customers 
from interest rate shocks. 
There are no significant correlations for the price response with the external 
finance statistics. For output there are some: greater reliance on equity finance as 
measured by both market capitalisation and the proportion of all external finance 
provided by bank loans is associated with larger output losses which also display 
greater peak magnitudes. Again this is counter to the credit channel theory: greater 
availability of external finance should insulate firms from contractions in bank loan 
supply. Conversely, the summary statistic for the importance of external finance has a 
positive (in line with theory) correlation with the peak response and sums for output, 
although this is not statistically significant. This is despite the opposite relationship 
being significant in the underlying statistics.
20 
                                                 
19 We ignore the uncertainty surrounding the central forecasts for the impulse responses. If we were to 
take this uncertainty into consideration the correlations given here would be less significant. Since we 
find little or no correlation when we overestimate the significance of the results, it does not affect our 
conclusion that there is no evidence to conclude that there is relationship between VAR outcomes and 
financial structure by overstating the significance of the evidence presented here. 
20 We also calculated Spearman’s rank correlations, which gave even an even lower number of 
statistically significant results. 
  18Cecchetti also looks at rights afforded to shareholders and to creditors and 
gives them a score. He also includes a variable to quantify the enforcement of these 
rights. For the recursive model we find no correlation for either prices or output with 
shareholder rights. We also find no correlation between creditor rights and the price 
responses. For output we find a positive correlation between creditor rights and both 
the peak output reponse and the 60 month sum (again, there is a difference if we sum 
over 36 months). Strangely, we find a negative correlation between the enforcement 
of these rights and the output responses. 
We would also expect to see Cecchetti’s overall predicted effectiveness of 
monetary policy statistic to be correlated with the responses at an individual country 
level if the ‘legal structure causes financial structure causes asymmetric transmission’ 
theory were true. The only significant relation that we found is that the peak impact of 
a shock on output occurs earlier if policy is expected to be effective. Whilst this is in 
line with theory one should bare in mind the almost random nature of the timing 
statistics discussed in section 3 above. If we chose a different VAR model the timing 
of the peak output responses is very different and this relationship will not hold. This 
can be seen, for example, in the correlations for the KRM80 model in table 9. 
 
Table 9 here 
 
If we now focus on table 9, which shows the same correlations calculated for 
the structural VAR KRM80 we can see even less associations with the underlying 
indicators. The only statistically significant correlations are negative relationship 
between the amount of corporate debt and the timing of the peak output response and 
between predominance of bank loans and the timing of the peak inflation effect (both 
in line with theory). Overall, we would have expected more significant results than 
this even if with no underlying relationship. In total there are 16 indicators correlated 
with 6 summary statistics (counting the two different sums as one separate statistic) 
giving a total of 96 correlations. With no underlying relationships we would expect to 
find 4.8 significant relations. We only find two.
21 
                                                 
21 We have also calculated the correlations for other VARs. If one takes the Q80IRDV model that is 
similar to the model used by Cecchetti, there are more significant correlations, although many are of 
opposite sign to that predicted by theory. For example, small banks are significantly correlated with 
smaller peak output responses at the 1% level even though theory suggests the opposite; furthermore, 
there is no correlation with the underlying statistics used to value the importance of small banks. If one 
  19Cecchetti’s next step is to group the countries into their legal families and look 
at the correlation between the average VAR statistic and the average predicted 
effectiveness for each legal family. The results of a comparable analysis for our two 
representative models are shown in table 10. Given that we have found virtually no 
correlation between our VAR outcomes and the statistics at the country level it is 
quite surprising to find that the results from the KRM80 model are highly correlated 
with the predicted effectiveness at the legal family level. The correlations are even of 
the correct sign: a higher predicted effectiveness of monetary policy is correlated with 
greater price reductions and greater output losses.
22 If the legal structure causing 
financial structure causing asymmetric transmission structure were true, we would 
expect to see evidence of this at the individual country level. With our results, we do 
not see a relationship between transmission magnitudes and financial structure 
indicators at the country level. Only when we aggregate to the legal family level do 
we find a correlation in line with Cecchetti’s theory and only for the KRM80 model, 
not the Q80 model.
23 This suggests that the result is merely due to aggregation. 
 





We estimated 43 VAR models to see if VAR based conclusions about asymmetric 
transmission of monetary policy in Europe are robust across different model 
specifications. The estimated responses of output are robust across the recursive 
models but this doesn’t extend to those models which are less susceptible to the price 
puzzle. The price responses are not robust. The claim that the price puzzle is of no 
concern when discussing the real effects of monetary policy shocks is wrong, because 
we have shown that using a model specification to that does not give rise to the price 
                                                                                                                                            
looks at the estimates reported by Cecchetti, there are instances when there is correlation with a 
summary indicator, for example availability of alternative finance and the timing of the price response, 
but not with any of the individual external finance availability statistics. Once again, we see that 
choosing different VARs gives different significant correlations. More details of correlations for other 
VARs available on request. 
22 We don’t pay too much attention to the significance level of these results because we have only 4 
observations. 
23 Given the lack of robustness among the VAR responses the conclusion that legal structure causes 
asymmetric transmission clearly relies heavily on which VAR model is chosen. 
  20puzzle changes the output responses so much that there is no correlation between the 
estimates of recursive models displaying the price puzzle and those that do not. The 
suggested remedies for the price puzzle in recursive VARs are not uniformly 
successful across countries; perhaps this should come as no surprise given that 
countries are different and their inflation processes may also be different. 
The model that was most successful in removing the price puzzle was the 7 
variable SVAR of Kim and Roubini (2000), which estimated a negative response of 
prices for all countries. This is in sharp contrast to the recursive models. 
We further demonstrate that the result and conclusion of Cecchetti (1999) is 
not robust across model specifications. In this regard we side with Angeloni, Kashyap, 
Mojon and Terlizzese (2001), who conclude that there do not appear to be 
asymmetries in transmission that are robust across different VAR specifications, let 
alone with other modelling strategies. A representative recursive model and the 
SVAR model of Kim and Roubini often had correlations of opposite signs with the 
financial structure indicators given by Cecchetti. Moreover, the picture painted by the 
correlation analysis differed sometimes between the underlying indicators and the 
condensed summary indicators. Whilst there is no correlation between the predicted 
effectiveness of monetary policy and the summary statistics from the 2 VAR models 
when analysed on a country-by-country basis, one appears for one of the VAR models 
when the countries are grouped into legal families for the SVAR model. This suggests 
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Table 1. Multi-country VAR Studies: A Summary 
Key: Au = Austria, Be = Belgium, Ca = Canada, Dk = Denmark, Fi = Finland, Fr = France, Ge = Germany, Gr = Greece, Ir = Ireland, It = Italy, Ja = Japan, Ne = 
Netherlands, Po = Portugal, Sp = Spain, Sw = Sweden, UK = UK, US = US. VAR = Vector Autoregression, SVAR = Structural VAR, VECM = Vector Error Correction 
Mechanism, GDP = Gross Domestic Product, CPI = Consumer Price Index, IPI = Industrial Production Index. 
Study        Countries  Variables Type   Estimation Period   Model Conclusion
Gerlach & Smets (1995)  Ca, Fr, 
Ge, It, Ja, 
UK, & US. 
SVAR 3. Real GDP, CPI, 
3 month money 
market/ treasury 
bill rate  
1979-1993 
Quarterly 
Three identifying restrictions: No long run 
effects of monetary shocks on real GDP. No 
long run effects of demand shocks on real 
GDP. No contemporaneous effect of monetary 
policy. 
Little evidence of large differences 
in transmission between 
countries, esp when CI are 
accounted for. Ca, Ge, US similar. 
Fr, It smaller (though possibly no 
exchange rate channel). Ja, UK in 
between. 
Ramaswamy & Sloek (1997)  Au, Be, 
Dk, Fi, Fr, 
Ge, It, Ne, 
Po, Sp, 
Sw, UK. 
VAR  3. Real GDP, CPI, 
money market rate
1972:1 - 1995:4 
Quarterly 
VAR in levels. Cholesky decompositon with 
causal order: GDP and CPI to money market 
rate. Since only interested in effects of 
monetary shocks, order of GDP and CPI is 
unimportant. Equivalent to saying monetary 
shocks have no contemporaneous effect on 
GDP or CPI.   
Two groups. Effect in Au, Be, Fi, 
Ge, Ne, UK, takes twice as long to 
occur and is roughly twice as 
deep as the rest: De, Fr, It, Po, 
Sp, Sw. 
Kieler & Saarenheimo (1998)  Fr, Ge, & 
UK 
VAR  3. Real GDP, CPI, 
money market rate
Early 70's - 1997 
Q3. Quarterly 
VAR in levels. Cholesky decomposition with 
order: Output- price level - interest rate. Took 
this orthoganalisation and rotated it in three 
diminsional space in order to generate many 
more  orthoganalisations for which impulse 
responses were calculated. Then, any 
responses that looked sensible were added to 
the plausible set. 
Taking into account all "plausible" 
identification schemes found little 
difference between transmission 
in the different countries. Also 
noted that differentness of UK 
comes from exchange rate 
assumption (fixed/floating). 
  24 Philipsen & Wuyts (1999)  Be, Dk, Fi, 
Fr, Ge, 




VAR  3. IPI, CPI, money 
market rate 
Jan 1972 - Dec 
1998. Monthly 
VAR in levels. Cholesky decompositon with 
causal order: GDP and CPI to money market 
rate. Since only interested in effects of 
monetary shocks, order of GDP and CPI is 
unimportant. Equivalent to saying monetary 
shocks have no contemporaneous effect on 
GDP or CPI.   
Effects of policy noticeably bigger 
in Be, Fi, Dk, It. Others are quite 
similar. 
Barran, Coudert & Mojon 
(1996) 
Au, Dk, Fi, 
Fr, Ge, It, 
Ne, Sp, 
UK. 
VAR  5. GDP, CPI, 
World Export 
Price, Exchange 




Mainly 1976:1 - 
1994. Quarterly 
Use various different VARs to analyse different 
questions. All based on VAR identified with 
Cholesky decomposition. Causal order: GDP, 
CPI, World Export Price, Exchange Rate, Call 
Money Market Rate. 
Mostly similar responses and lags 
except in magnitudes. Ge esp 
high, Scandinavian Countries 
lowest. Other in between. Effects 
last longest in Ge, and Au. 
Dedola & Lippi (2004)  Fr, Ge, It, 
UK, US. 
VAR  5/6. IPI, CPI, 
commodity price 
index, 3 month 
interbank interest 
rate (Fed funds 
rate for US), M3 
(US M1). Non US 
also have trade 
weighted 
exchange rate 
Jan 1975 - Mar 
1997. Monthly 
Cholesky approach. Ordering of variables: 
Industrial Production, CPI, Commodity Price 
Index, stir, a monetary aggregate. 
Ge most affected, It next most, Fr, 
UK & US least affected. 
  25 Ehrmann (2000)  Au, Be, 
Dk, Fi, Fr, 




VECM 4/5. IPI, CPI, 3 
month money 
market/ treasury 
bill rate, DM or $ 
exchange rate, 
plus extra interest 
rate (Ge short 
term or own long 




Except Ge 1979-, 
Po 1983-, UK 
1980-. Quarterly 
SVAR with short term interest rates, inflation, 
real industrial production, exchange rate, & CB 
behaviour. First four common to all countries. 
Long term interest rates (Fr, Sw), Ge short term 
interest rate. (Au,Be, Ne), Commodity prices 
(Ge, UK), or special (Sp). Identification: 
Cointegration as suggested by Johansen 
method plus no contemporaneus effect of 
monetary policy. 
Large variation across countries, 
esp UK which is impacted much 
more by similar shock.  
Mojon & Peersman (2002)  Au, Be, Fi, 
Fr, Ge, Ir, 
It, Ne, Po, 
Sp 
VAR    4/5  endogenous.










3 identification schemes: 1 for Ge, 1 for core 
(Au, Be, Ne) and 1 for other countries. Use 
exogenous variables to allow for Ge leadership. 
Ge exogenous vars: commodity prices, US 
GDP, US STIR. Core ex: as Ge plus block 
exogenous Ge VAR model; use Ge shocks for 
analysis. Non-core ex: as Ge; use bilateral DM 
exchange rate instead of real effective 
exchange rate.  
Given width of CI cannot reject 
broadly similar transmission 
mechanism. Ne, Fi show largest 
output effect; Po, It, Sp show 
smallest. Others similar. 
Altavilla (2000)  Au, Be, Fi, 
Fr, Ge, Ir, 
It, Ne, Po, 
Sp 
VECM 5. Real IPI, CPI, 





1979:1 to 1998:4. 
Quarterly 
Altavilla uses both contemporaneus and 
cointegration restrictions to identify the five 
variable SVAR. The variables are nominal short 
term interest rate, output, inflation, commodity 
price index, and the real exchange rate. Only 
the latter is assumed to be affected 
contemporaneously by monetary shocks. 
There are asymmetries between 
the countries but these are mainly 
in the response of real output to 
the monetary policy shock. Larger 
response in Fr, Fi, Ge, It, Po than 
in the rest. This group includes 
three out of four larger counties. 
  26 Clements, Kontolemis & Levy 
(2001) 
Au, Be, Fi, 
Fr, Ge, Ir, 
It, Ne, Po, 
Sp 
VAR  5 GDP, CPI, STIR, 
effective exchange 
rate, private sector 
credit 
1983:1 to 1998:4. 
Quarterly. 
Cholesky decomposition with ordering as per 
variables list. Dummies for Ge reunification and 
for USSR break-up for Fi. 
Au, Ge, and Ne have largest 
effects, Fi and Sp smallest. Others 
in between. 
Kim & Roubini (2000)  Ca, Fr, 
Ge, It, Ja, 
UK 
SVAR 7. Oil price, US 
Fed Funds Rate, 
IPI, CPI, money, 




Fr -92:2, Ca 92:5.
Structural VAR based upon information 
restrictions. Monetary policy does not respond 
contemporaneously to IPI, CPI or the Fed 
Funds Rate. 1 standard deviation shocks. See 
Kim and Roubini for further details. 
Ge suffers the largest output fall 
from a small shock. Fr, It, and UK 
similar in magnitude although size 
of shock in Fr much bigger. 
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Table 2. The models compared  
Model Endognenous  Variables Exogenous 
Variables 
Notes 
Q73  GDP, CPI, STIR    Cholesky Decomposition 
Q80  GDP, CPI, STIR     Cholesky Decomposition 
Q731D  D GDP, D CPI, STIR     Cholesky Decomposition 
Q801D  D GDP, D CPI, STIR     Cholesky Decomposition 
Q73ΠG  HP GDP, CPI Inflation (Year 
on Year), STIR 
   Cholesky Decomposition 
Q80ΠG  HP GDP, CPI Inflation (Year 
on Year), STIR 
   Cholesky Decomposition 
Q80GEIR  GDP, CPI, STIR  German STIR  Cholesky Decomposition 
Q73GEIR  GDP, CPI, STIR  German STIR  Cholesky Decomposition 
Q73OIL  GDP, CPI, STIR  World Oil Price  Cholesky Decomposition 
Q80OIL  GDP, CPI, STIR  World Oil Price  Cholesky Decomposition 
Q73IRD  GDP, CPI, STIRD    Cholesky Decomposition 
Q80IRD  GDP, CPI, STIRD    Cholesky Decomposition 
Q73IRDV  GDP, CPI, STIRD    VECM using Johansen’s method 
Q80IRDV  GDP, CPI, STIRD    VECM using Johansen’s method 
Q73BQ  GDP, CPI, STIR    STIR shocks have no long-run effects 
on GDP or CPI 
Q80BQ  GDP, CPI, STIR    STIR shocks have no long-run effects 
on GDP or CPI 
Q73M  GDP, CPI, STIR, Money     Cholesky Decomposition 
Q80M  GDP, CPI, STIR, Money     Cholesky Decomposition 
Q73E  GDP, CPI, STIR, NEER     Cholesky Decomposition 
Q80E  GDP, CPI, STIR, NEER     Cholesky Decomposition 
Q73IPI  IPI, CPI, STIR     Cholesky Decomposition 
Q80IPI  IPI, CPI, STIR     Cholesky Decomposition 
 
  28Table 2 (cont): The models compared. 
Model Endognenous  Variables Exogenous 
Variables 
Notes 
M73  IPI, CPI, STIR     Cholesky Decomposition 
M80  IPI, CPI, STIR     Cholesky Decomposition 
M731D  D IPI, D CPI, STIR     Cholesky Decomposition 
M801D  D IPI, D CPI, STIR     Cholesky Decomposition 
M73ΠG  HP IPI, CPI Inflation (Year 
on Year), STIR 
   Cholesky Decomposition 
M80ΠG  HP IPI, CPI Inflation (Year 
on Year), STIR 
   Cholesky Decomposition 
M73GEIR  IPI, CPI, STIR  German STIR  Cholesky Decomposition 
M80GEIR  IPI, CPI, STIR  German STIR  Cholesky Decomposition 
M73OIL  IPI, CPI, STIR  World Oil Price  Cholesky Decomposition 
M80OIL  IPI, CPI, STIR  World Oil Price  Cholesky Decomposition 
M73IRD  IPI, CPI, STIRD    Cholesky Decomposition 
M80IRD  IPI, CPI, STIRD    Cholesky Decomposition 
M73IRDV  IPI, CPI, STIRD    VECM using Johansen’s method 
M80IRDV  IPI, CPI, STIRD    VECM using Johansen’s method 
M73BQ  IPI, CPI, STIR    STIR shocks have no long-run effects 
on GDP or CPI 
M80BQ  IPI, CPI, STIR    STIR shocks have no long-run effects 
on GDP or CPI 
M73M  IPI, CPI, STIR, Money     Cholesky Decomposition 
M80M  IPI, CPI, STIR, Money     Cholesky Decomposition 
M73E  IPI, CPI, STIR, NEER     Cholesky Decomposition 
M80E  IPI, CPI, STIR, NEER     Cholesky Decomposition 
KRM80  IPI, CPI, STIR, World Oil 
Price, German (or US) STIR, 
Nominal Exchange Rate with 
DM (or US$), Money 
   SVAR based on Kim and Roubini 
 
The models are named so that the first letter indicates quarterly (Q) or monthly (M) data, then the 
number indicates the sample period: 1973-98 (73) or 1980-98 (80). GDP is Gross Domestic Product, 
IPI is an Industrial Production Index, CPI is a Consumer Price Index, STIR is a Short-Term Interest 
Rate, STIRD is the Short-Term Interest Rate Differential vis-à-vis Germany (the US for Germany), HP 
indicates the use of the Hodrick-Prescott filter, D represents the first difference operator, NEER is the 
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate. Models with GDP for Germany also included a reunification 
dummy.
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Table 3: Data sources  
 
All data from the International Financial Statistics, IMF except for the nominal exchange rate vs. 
Germany used in the KRM80 model, which is from the Bundesbank. Salient features of the data series 
described below. 
 
 Interest  rate  Money 
Austria  Money Market Rate  M1 
Belgium  Call Money Rate  M3 (Starts 1979M12) 
Finland  Central Bank Rate  M3 (Starts 1974M12) 
France  Call Money Rate  M1 (Starts 1977M12) 
Germany  Call Money Rate  M1 
Italy  Money Market Rate  M2 (Starts 1974M12) 
Netherlands  Call Money Rate  M2 (Ends 1997M12) 
Spain  Bank Of Spain Rate  M1 
Sweden  Call Money Rate  National definition 
UK Interbank  rate  M0 
  30Table 4. Average Pearson correlation between price responses from one VAR 
model with the rest 
 
Peak  Timing  Sum (60)  Sum (60) >0 
= Zero 
Sum (60) >0 
= Blank 
Sum (36) 
Q73  0.17 0.11 0.16  -  -  0.15 
Q80  0.32 0.31 0.05 0.04 0.24 0.04 
Q731D 0.24 0.13 0.19 0.09 -0.03 0.20 
Q801D 0.21 0.20 0.07 0.12  -  0.09 
Q73ΠG  -0.22 0.08 0.13 -0.03 -0.24 0.11 
Q80ΠG  0.15 0.27 0.12 -0.02  -  0.14 
Q73GEIR  0.36 0.26 0.16 0.09 0.40 0.20 
Q80GEIR  0.24 0.34 0.03 0.15 0.24 0.04 
Q73OIL  0.20 0.24 0.08 0.09  -  0.08 
Q80OIL  0.22 0.31 0.05 0.09 0.40 0.01 
Q73IRD  0.34 0.24 0.12 0.18 -0.12 0.08 
Q80IRD  0.21 0.28 -0.03 0.13 0.18 -0.01 
Q73IRDV  0.38 0.17 0.07 0.19 0.31 0.03 
Q80IRDV  0.21 0.36 -0.05 0.12 0.12 -0.01 
Q73BQ 0.26  -  -0.10 0.12  0.06 -0.09 
Q80BQ 0.21  -  -0.06 0.12  0.15 -0.02 
Q73M  0.25 0.20 0.16 0.15  -  0.16 
Q80M  0.30 0.35 0.05 0.12 0.58 0.03 
Q73E  -0.05  -0.18  0.10 -  - 0.08 
Q80E  0.33 0.37 0.04 -0.06  -  0.02 
Q73IPI 0.01 0.06 0.16 0.14  -  0.18 
Q80IPI 0.15 0.24 0.08 0.10 0.29 0.10 
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Table 4 (cont): Average Pearson correlation between price responses from one VAR model with the 
rest and the overall mean correlation across all VARs. 
 
Peak  Timing  Sum (60)  Sum (60) >0 
= Zero 
Sum (60) >0 
= Blank 
Sum (36) 
M73  0.07 -0.31 0.00  -  -  0.10 
M80 0.07  0.27  0.14  -  -  0.18 
M731D 0.00 0.22 0.08 -0.10  -  0.15 
M801D 0.14 -0.20 0.05  -  -  0.15 
M73ΠG  0.04 0.31 0.14 -0.02 0.07 0.17 
M80ΠG  0.21  0.20  0.09  0.14 - 0.10 
M73GEIR  0.12 -0.20 0.07 -0.03  -  0.17 
M80GEIR  0.36 0.33 0.11 0.09 0.15 0.17 
M73OIL  0.13 -0.01 0.07 0.08  -  0.15 
M80OIL  0.06  0.27  0.14  0.14 - 0.19 
M73IRD  0.24 -0.02 -0.08 0.06 -0.23 -0.06 
M80IRD  0.40 0.36 0.00 0.23 0.47 0.01 
M73IRDV  0.11 0.16 0.02 0.05 -0.10 0.01 
M80IRDV  0.36 0.32 0.02 0.23 0.41 0.00 
M73BQ 0.20  -  -0.05 0.14 0.16 -0.15 
M80BQ 0.09 0.21 -0.17 0.00 0.31 -0.22 
M73M -0.04  0.11 0.04  -  -  0.12 
M80M -0.05  0.26 0.08  -  -  0.16 
M73E 0.08  -0.38  -0.01 -  - 0.09 
M80E 0.31  0.33  0.06 -  - 0.08 
KRM80 0.01 0.19 -0.26 -0.09 0.12 -0.26 
Mean  0.17 0.16 0.05 0.08 0.17 0.07 
 
  32 
Table 5. Average Pearson correlation between output responses from one VAR 
model with the rest 
 
Peak  Timing  Sum (60)  Sum (60) >0 
= Zero 
Sum (60) >0 
= Blank 
Sum (36) 
Q73  0.72 0.20 0.56 0.69 0.77 0.59 
Q80  0.69 0.20 0.56 0.69 0.83 0.60 
Q731D 0.74 -0.20 0.57 0.70 0.79 0.59 
Q801D 0.73 0.05 0.53 0.65 0.78 0.57 
Q73ΠG  0.66 -0.03 0.54 0.65 0.73 0.54 
Q80ΠG  0.71 -0.12 0.56 0.69 0.82 0.59 
Q73GEIR  0.74 0.22 0.55 0.69 0.80 0.57 
Q80GEIR  0.74 0.26 0.56 0.69 0.82 0.59 
Q73OIL  0.73 0.20 0.56 0.70 0.82 0.59 
Q80OIL  0.68 0.19 0.55 0.68 0.82 0.60 
Q73IRD  0.72 0.06 -0.14  -0.08 0.32 0.19 
Q80IRD  0.67 -0.05 0.22 0.30 0.43 0.36 
Q73IRDV  0.62 0.06 -0.26  -0.06 0.13 0.05 
Q80IRDV  0.67 0.10 0.50 0.65 0.77 0.56 
Q73BQ 0.62  0.22 -0.59  -  -  -0.63 
Q80BQ 0.42  0.19 -0.46 -0.14  -  -0.54 
Q73M  0.71 0.13 0.56 0.69 0.76 0.60 
Q80M  0.68 0.17 0.54 0.67 0.80 0.59 
Q73E  0.71 0.15 0.55 0.68 0.74 0.58 
Q80E  0.67 0.16 0.53 0.67 0.81 0.57 
Q73IPI 0.46 0.14 0.33 0.44 0.58 0.38 
Q80IPI 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.36 0.22 
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Table 5 (cont): Average Pearson correlation between output responses from one VAR model with the 
rest and the overall mean correlation across all VARs. 
 
Peak  Timing  Sum (60)  Sum (60) >0 
= Zero 
Sum (60) >0 
= Blank 
Sum (36) 
M73  0.74 0.03 0.52 0.66 0.72 0.56 
M80  0.73 0.06 0.55 0.67 0.80 0.58 
M731D 0.41 0.01 0.49 0.63 0.75 0.48 
M801D 0.50 -0.07 0.50 0.63 0.75 0.52 
M73ΠG  0.41 0.14 0.51 0.68 0.87 0.49 
M80ΠG  0.39 0.10 0.55 0.68 0.80 0.56 
M73GEIR  0.73 0.08 0.51 0.65 0.70 0.53 
M80GEIR  0.75 0.12 0.55 0.68 0.80 0.58 
M73OIL  0.73 0.10 0.53 0.67 0.79 0.56 
M80OIL  0.74 0.07 0.55 0.67 0.85 0.58 
M73IRD  0.56 -0.08 0.26 0.35 0.43 0.34 
M80IRD 0.15  -0.04 -0.08  -0.12  0.38  0.02 
M73IRDV  0.45 -0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.11 0.19 
M80IRDV -0.02  -0.02  -0.32  -0.23  0.22  -0.27 
M73BQ 0.57 0.21 -0.49  -  -  -0.52 
M80BQ 0.01 0.00 -0.48 -0.06  -  -0.50 
M73M  0.74 -0.11 0.54 0.68 0.73 0.58 
M80M  0.73 -0.19 0.55 0.68 0.74 0.59 
M73E  0.69 0.02 0.43 0.56 0.63 0.46 
M80E  0.71 0.06 0.41 0.59 0.80 0.51 
KRM80 0.30 0.01 0.22 0.30 0.44 0.05 
Mean  0.59 0.07 0.32 0.49 0.66 0.36 
 
  34 




Peak  Sum (60)  Peak  Sum (60) 
Q73 0.23  0.33  0.88  0.88 
Q80 0.21  0.22  0.86  0.87 
Q73GEIR 0.28  0.15  0.88  0.89 
Q80GEIR 0.12  -0.16  0.89  0.89 
Q73OIL 0.18  0.22  0.89  0.89 
Q80OIL 0.15  0.22  0.85  0.86 
Q73M 0.19  0.24 0.87  0.87 
Q80M 0.22  0.20 0.84  0.83 
Q73E 0.04  0.31  0.86  0.86 
Q80E 0.22  0.23  0.84  0.84 
Q73IPI 0.03 0.37 0.53 0.51 
Q80IPI 0.03 0.27 0.19 0.19 
M73 0.16  0.06  0.86  0.86 
M80 0.11  0.18  0.88  0.87 
M73GEIR 0.21  0.11  0.84  0.85 
M80GEIR 0.39  0.07  0.88  0.89 
M73OIL 0.20  0.16  0.86  0.87 
M80OIL 0.11  0.20  0.88  0.88 
M73M -0.06 0.11 0.87 0.87 
M80M -0.04 0.19 0.89 0.88 
M73E 0.17  0.04  0.76  0.73 
M80E 0.37  -0.01  0.81  0.66 
Mean 0.16  0.17  0.81  0.81 
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Table 7. Average Pearson correlation among VARs that suffer less from the 




Peak  Sum (60)  Peak  Sum (60) 
Q80 0.55  -0.26  0.58  0.50 
Q731D 0.48 0.09 0.58 0.48 
Q80GEIR 0.51  0.25  0.58  0.46 
Q80OIL 0.27  -0.25  0.58  0.49 
Q80IRD 0.47  0.18  0.53  0.21 
Q80IRDV 0.46  0.15  0.52  0.43 
M73ΠG  -0.07 -0.10  0.23  0.38 
M80IRD 0.54  0.20  0.16  0.02 
M73IRDV -0.03  0.03  0.27  0.06 
M80IRDV 0.45  0.21  0.03  -0.26 
KRM80 0.04 -0.21  0.33  0.17 
Mean 0.33  0.03  0.40  0.27 
 
Note: Included are those specifications that gave a negative estimated price response when summed 
over 60 months. 
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Table 8. Kendall rank correlation between estimated policy effects of the 
recursive VAR 3Q80 and financial indicator statistics 
  Prices Output 









0.07 0.30  -0.29  -0.33  0.24 -0.33 0.24 0.29 
Banks Per 
Million People  0.02 -0.09  -0.34  0.02  -0.02 -0.39 -0.02 -0.07 
Concentration 
Ratio: Top Five 
Assets 
-0.07 -0.55*  0.29  0.51* -0.33  0.28  -0.33  -0.29 
Bank Health 
Return on 
Assets  0.00 -0.22  0.18  0.23  -0.14 0.36  -0.14 -0.18 
Loan Loss 
Provisions  0.09 -0.12  0.14  0.27  -0.05 -0.22 -0.05 0.00 
Net Interest 
Margins  0.11 0.12  0.29  0.16  0.02 0.00  0.02 0.07 
Operating Costs 




-0.02 -0.30  0.07  0.47*  -0.29 -0.14  -0.29 -0.33 
Importance of External Finance 
No Publicly 




-0.20 -0.37  0.16  0.38 -0.29 0.47* -0.29 -0.24 
Market Cap as 
% GDP  -0.24 -0.12  0.02  0.24  -0.42*  0.66**  -0.42* -0.38 
Corporate Debt 
as % GDP  0.02 -0.30  0.02  0.07  -0.24 -0.05 -0.24 -0.29 
Bank Loans % 
of all Finance  0.09 -0.06  0.18  -0.18  0.45* -0.26 0.45* 0.41 
 
  37Table 8 (cont): Kendall rank correlation between estimated policy effects of the recursive VAR 3Q80 
and financial indicator statistics 
  Prices Output 








Shareholder and Creditor Rights 
Shareholder 
Rights  0.08 -0.23 0.19 0.08 0.03 0.26 0.03 0.14 
Creditor 
Rights  0.00  -0.14  0.10  0.05 0.46* -0.19 0.46*  0.36 
Enforcement 
-0.28 -0.52* -0.08 0.48*  -0.53* 0.13 -0.53*  -0.53* 
Cecchetti's Summary Statistics 
Small Banks 
0.35 0.07  -0.03  -0.35  0.56*  -0.68**  0.56*  0.51* 
Bank Health 
0.19  -0.08 -0.08 0.08 -0.36 -0.24 -0.36 -0.36 
Alternative 
Finance  0.08 -0.04 0.08 -0.03  0.30 -0.45 0.30 0.30 
Predicted 
Effectiveness  0.21  0.00  -0.02  -0.16  0.26 -0.64** 0.26  0.21 
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Table 9. Kendall rank correlation between estimated policy effects of the 
structural VAR KRM80 and  financial indicator statistics  
 Prices  Output 









-0.02 -0.07 -0.07  0.07 0.11 0.44  -0.07  0.02 
Banks Per 




-0.24 0.16 -0.20 -0.07  -0.29  -0.34 -0.20  -0.38 
Bank Health 
Return on 
Assets  0.05 -0.05 0.00  -0.14  -0.09  -0.42  0.00  -0.09 
Loan Loss 
Provisions  0.05 0.00 -0.27 -0.14  -0.18  0.37 -0.45  -0.18 
Net Interest 
Margins  0.38 -0.02 0.07  0.02 0.07  0.29  -0.02  0.24 
Operating 




-0.20 0.38 -0.16 -0.20  -0.24  0.34  -0.24  0.02 
Importance of External Finance 
No Publicly 




-0.11 0.11  0.02  -0.11  -0.16  -0.10  0.02  -0.07 
Market Cap as 
% GDP  0.02 0.24 0.07 -0.16  -0.11  -0.15 0.07  -0.02 
Corporate Debt 
as % GDP  -0.42 0.16 -0.11 -0.07  -0.11  -0.53* 0.07  -0.11 
Bank Loans % 
of all Finance  -0.09 -0.49* -0.18  0.05 -0.05 -0.07  -0.18  -0.23 
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Table 9 (cont): Kendall rank correlation between estimated policy effects of the structural VAR 
KRM80 and financial indicator statistics  
 Prices  Output 




Peak Time Sum  (60) Sum 
(36) 
Shareholder and Creditor Rights 
Shareholder 
Rights  0.19 0.03 0.08 -0.03  0.03  0.27 -0.03 0.03 
Creditor 
Rights  -0.15 -0.41 -0.10 -0.21  -0.05  -0.08  0.00  0.00 
Enforcement 
-0.48 -0.03 -0.23 -0.13  -0.48  -0.27 -0.33  -0.43 
Cecchetti's Summary Statistics 
Small Banks 
-0.08 -0.24 -0.19 0.03 0.13  0.06  -0.13  -0.08 
Bank Health 
-0.14 0.53 -0.14 -0.08  -0.08  0.12 -0.14  0.03 
Alternative 
Finance  -0.08 -0.08 -0.24 -0.03  -0.08  0.41  -0.35  -0.13 
Predicted 
Effectiveness  -0.16 -0.02 -0.16 -0.02  0.02  0.25  -0.16  -0.07 
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Table 10.  Kendall rank correlations between the VAR estimates and the 




Peak Inflation  0.33 -0.67 
Time Inflation  -0.33 0.00 
Sum Inflation 60  0.33 -0.67 
Sum Inflation 36  0.00 -0.67 
Peak Output  0.33 -0.33 
Timing Output  -0.67 -1.00* 
Sum Output 60  0.33 -0.67 
Sum Output 36  0.33 -1.00* 
 





















Q73IPI -- - ----- - ----- - Q73IPI
Q80IPI --- - - - - Q80IPI
M73 ----------------- --- M73
M80 ---- - --- - ----- - - M80
M731D --- ------------- - - M731D
M801D ---- - -- --- -- - M801D
M73ΠG - --- - - - - - - - - M73ΠG
M80ΠG --- - - - - -- - M80ΠG
M73GEIR ----- --- - ----- --- -- M73GEIR
M80GEIR -- M80GEIR
M73OIL ----- --- ---- - -- M73OIL
M80OIL ---- - --- - -- -- - - M80OIL
M73IRD ---- - --- -- M73IRD
M80IRD -- - - - M80IRD
M73IRDV -- - - --- -- M73IRDV
M80IRDV -- - - M80IRDV
M73BQ --- - - - - - ---- - -- M73BQ
M80BQ --- - - - - - - ---- ---- - M80BQ
M73M ---- ------------ - - - -- - --- -- M73M
M80M ---- -------------- - - - --- - M80M
M73E ----- ----- ----- --- -- --- M73E
M80E --- - - - - -- M80E
KRM80 - - -- - - - - - - ----- - -- - -  

















Q73E - ------- - ---- Q73E
Q80E - Q80E
Q73IPI -- -- - - - Q73IPI
Q80IPI -- - Q80IPI
M73 -- ----- --------- M73
M80 -- - M80
M731D - - ----- M731D
M801D -- - ------- - --- -- M801D
M73ΠG -- - M73ΠG
M80ΠG -- - -- -- M80ΠG
M73GEIR ------ --- - --- --- ----- M73GEIR
M80GEIR -- - - M80GEIR
M73OIL - --- -- - - - - - -- M73OIL
M80OIL -- - - - M80OIL
M73IRD - -- - - - -- ---- -- M73IRD
M80IRD -- - -- M80IRD
M73IRDV - - - ---- - -- M73IRDV
M80IRDV -- - -- M80IRDV
M80BQ - - ----- -- --- M80BQ
M73M - - -- --- - - - -- - - M73M
M80M -- - - - - - M80M
M73E ---------------- --- -- -- ---------- M73E
M80E -- - - - - -
KRM80 - - - --- -- --- --
M80E
 












Q80IRD -- -- --- Q80IRD
Q73IRDV --- Q73IRDV
Q80IRDV -- -- --- - Q80IRDV
Q73BQ --- --- --- - Q73BQ
Q80BQ --- -- --- - Q80BQ
Q73M -- - - Q73M
Q80M --- - - - Q80M
Q73E --- - - - Q73E
Q80E --- - - - Q80E
Q73IPI --- - - - Q73IPI
Q80IPI --- - - - Q80IPI
M73 --- ------- - ------ M73
M80 -- ----- - ---- - M80
M731D - ------ - -- - - M731D
M801D --- ------- - ---- - M801D
M73ΠG - -------- - - M73ΠG
M80ΠG -- ---- - ------ - M80ΠG
M73GEIR --- --- --- - ------ M73GEIR
M80GEIR -- -- -- - ----- M80GEIR
M73OIL -- ------ - ---- - - M73OIL
M80OIL - ---- - ---- M80OIL
M73IRD - --- - - ---------- -- M73IRD
M80IRD -- -- -- - ------ --- - M80IRD
M73IRDV - - --- ------ -- M73IRDV
M80IRDV -- -- -- - ------ --- -- M80IRDV
M73BQ - - --- ----- ---- M73BQ
M80BQ --- --- --- - -------------------- M80BQ
M73M -- ------- - ---- - - ------ M73M
M80M - ------ - -- - - ------ M80M
M73E --- ------- - ------ - ------ M73E
M80E -- - ----- - ------ - - - ----
KRM80 ------- --- - ------ ------- ------ - -
M80E
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M80IRD -- -- --- M80IRD
M73IRDV -- M73IRDV
M80IRDV - --- --- -- - -- -- --- ------- - M80IRDV
M73BQ -- M73BQ





KRM80 -- - - - -
M80E
 






Q80PG -- - Q80PG
Q73GEIR -- - Q73GEIR
Q80GEIR -- - Q80GEIR
Q73OIL -- - Q73OIL
Q80OIL -- - Q80OIL
Q73IRD -- Q73IRD
Q80IRD -- - Q80IRD
Q73IRDV - Q73IRDV
Q80IRDV -- - - Q80IRDV
Q73BQ -- - - Q73BQ
Q80BQ -- - Q80BQ
Q73M -- - - Q73M
Q80M ---- Q80M
Q73E -- - - Q73E
Q80E ---- Q80E
Q73IPI -- -- Q73IPI
Q80IPI -- - Q80IPI
M73 - -- ----- - - - M73
M80 - - -- - --- ------ M80
M731D -- - - - - M731D
M801D - -- - ----- ---- - - M801D
M73PG -- - -- -- M73PG
M80PG - -- - -- ---- --- M80PG
M73GEIR -- - -- ----- - ----- - - M73GEIR
M80GEIR - - -- - --- - -- --- M80GEIR
M73OIL -- - ----- - - - -- M73OIL
M80OIL - - -- - --- ------ --- - M80OIL
M73IRD - - --- --- - - ---- -- ---- M73IRD
M80IRD -- ------ ---------- -- - M80IRD
M73IRDV - -- - - ---- -- - -- - M73IRDV
M80IRDV - - -- - ---- -- --- -- - - M80IRDV
M73BQ - - - --- - - - M73BQ
M80BQ - - ---- - - ------ --- - - - M80BQ
M73M -- -- -------------- -- -- - -- - -- M73M
M80M -- - ---------------- -- -- - ---- -- M80M
M73E - -- ------- - - - - - --- - M73E
M80E - - -- - --- -- --- --- - - - --
KRM80 -- - - ----- - - - -- - - -
M80E
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Q73IRD --- ------ Q73IRD
Q80IRD - Q80IRD
Q73IRDV ---------- - Q73IRDV
Q80IRDV -- Q80IRDV
Q73BQ ---------- - - Q73BQ
Q80BQ ----------- -- Q80BQ
Q73M --- - Q73M
Q80M -- - Q80M
Q73E --- - Q73E
Q80E -- - Q80E
Q73IPI -- - Q73IPI
Q80IPI -- - - Q80IPI
M73 --- - M73
M80 --- - M80
M731D --- - M731D
M801D --- - M801D
M73ΠG --- - M73ΠG
M80ΠG --- - M80ΠG
M73GEIR --- - M73GEIR
M80GEIR --- - M80GEIR
M73OIL --- - M73OIL
M80OIL --- - M80OIL
M73IRD --- - - M73IRD
M80IRD --- ----- - - -- -- ----------- M80IRD
M73IRDV - - --- -- - - - - M73IRDV
M80IRDV ---------- - - ----- ----------- M80IRDV
M73BQ ---------- - - ----- ----------- - M73BQ
M80BQ ---------- - - ----------------- - M80BQ
M73M --- - - --- M73M
M80M --- - - --- M80M
M73E - - -- - ----- M73E
M80E --- - - - -- - -
KRM80 -- - --- - -
M80E
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